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REGULATION X: A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE 
REGULATION OF MORTGAGE SERVICERS 
ABSTRACT 
Mortgage servicers are responsible for handling the day-to-day processing 
of mortgage loans. These responsibilities include processing borrower 
payments, transferring funds to trustees and investors, and answering 
borrower inquiries. Mortgage servicers are also responsible for handling 
delinquent loans when a borrower is late making payments. If a borrower does 
not cure the delinquency, mortgage servicers are responsible for choosing 
whether to pursue a foreclosure sale or to implement a loss mitigation option. 
Foreclosures are detrimental to borrowers and the surrounding 
community. Forcing a borrower to leave her home creates a negative feedback 
loop, lowering property values in the surrounding area. Loss mitigation 
options are pursued as an alternative to avoid the harmful effects of 
foreclosures. 
The financial crisis of 2007–2008 brought to light mortgage servicer 
behavior that pushed through an unnecessary number of foreclosures, even 
where borrowers had finalized loss mitigation negotiations with mortgage 
servicers. Reports attribute these foreclosures to miscommunication between 
servicers and borrowers and poor internal communication within servicers. 
The unprecedented number of foreclosures exacerbated the severity of the 
financial crisis. 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the Bureau), created by the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, has 
finalized new regulations aimed at stopping the servicing behavior that 
contributed to such unnecessary foreclosures. The new regulations are 
amendments to Regulation X, the implementing regulation of the Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act. The amendments, proposed under the Bureau’s 
broad rulemaking power, require servicers to make early contact with 
delinquent borrowers, implement continuity-of-contact procedures, and 
establish loss mitigation application review procedures. This Comment 
explores the Bureau’s enforcement powers and the legality of the amendments 
as permissible expressions of the Bureau’s rulemaking authority. This 
Comment concludes that the broad deference to federal agencies under step 
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two of the Chevron doctrine includes the amendments within the scope of the 
Bureau’s rulemaking power. 
This Comment also addresses the immediate and potential effects of the 
amendments. The amendments’ immediate effects are uniformity of industry 
standards and data creation. The Bureau is equipped with stronger 
supervisory and enforcement powers than any previous federal agency in this 
field. The amendments create an observable record of servicer behavior that 
will allow the Bureau to efficiently enforce federal consumer protection law, 
bringing greater accountability to the mortgage servicing industry. Despite 
this strong immediate effect, the amendments leave room for servicer 
discretion and manipulation, which would leave borrowers exposed to the 
prospect of unnecessary foreclosures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Mortgage servicers are responsible for the day-to-day processing of 
mortgage loans. This includes processing payments, communicating with 
borrowers and investors, and handling escrow accounts.1 Additionally, when a 
borrower defaults on her loan, servicers are responsible for proceeding with a 
foreclosure sale, which can be detrimental to the borrower and the surrounding 
community, or avoiding foreclosure by implementing various loss mitigation 
options.2 Because the residential mortgage market is the single largest market 
for consumer financial products and services in the United States, servicers are 
charged with immense responsibility.3 
Poor lending practices during the 1990s and early 2000s led to a wave of 
borrower delinquencies, causing the financial crisis of 2007–2008.4 Mortgage 
servicers, who faced very little government oversight and regulation, were 
unprepared to handle the wave of defaults. Borrowers, who in previous years 
might have had the opportunity to pursue a loss mitigation option, were pushed 
through hasty foreclosures.5 The increase in foreclosures increased the harm to 
borrowers and communities, creating a negative feedback loop.6 
As one response to the financial crisis, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act).7 
Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act created a new agency, the Consumer Financial 
 
 1 See FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE SERVICING COMPENSATION DISCUSSION 
PAPER 3 (2011), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/22663/ServicingCompDiscussionPaperFinal0927 
11.pdf.  
 2 See id. at 4. 
 3 Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. 
Reg. 10,696, 10,699 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024). The residential mortgage market 
totals $10.3 trillion in outstanding loans. Id. 
 4 See CATE REAVIS, MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008: THE ROLE OF 
GREED, FEAR, AND OLIGARCHS 3–5 (2009), available at https://mitsloan.mit.edu/MSTIR/world-economy/ 
Crisis-2008-2009/Documents/09-093%20The%20Financial%20Crisis%20of%202008.Rev.pdf. 
 5 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 57,200, 57,251 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024). 
 6 See Patricia A. McCoy, Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the Financial Crisis, 55 ARIZ. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 6–7), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2254662.  
 7 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).  
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Protection Bureau (the Bureau), charged exclusively with regulating the 
services and products in the consumer financial market.8 The Bureau’s goals 
are to protect borrowers by creating transparency and accountability.9 
Congress granted the Bureau broad rulemaking and enforcement powers to 
accomplish these goals.10 
The Bureau used its rulemaking powers to promulgate a new rule with 
stricter requirements for mortgage servicers. The new rule amends nine areas 
of Regulation X, the implementing regulation of the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act (RESPA).11 Four of the amendments are promulgated under 
the Bureau’s broad rulemaking power.12 The first amendment requires 
servicers to implement general recordkeeping procedures.13 The second 
requires early contact with delinquent borrowers.14 The third requires servicers 
to maintain a point of contact with borrowers,15 and the fourth requires 
servicers to implement procedures for the review of loss mitigation 
applications.16 These regulations are generally aimed at monitoring servicer 
behavior and preventing borrowers from undergoing unnecessary 
foreclosures.17 
The regulations trigger two questions that prompt further inquiry. The 
answers to these questions are addressed in this Comment. The first question is 
whether the Bureau has properly interpreted its grant of broad rulemaking 
power from Congress, which gave the Bureau the authority to issue any rules 
necessary to achieve the Dodd-Frank Act’s consumer protection goals. An 
 
 8 See DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 
(CFPB): A LEGAL ANALYSIS 9 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42572.pdf. 
 9 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,844 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024); Richard Cordray, Dir., 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Prepared Remarks at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Field Hearing on 
Mortgage Policy (Jan. 17, 2013), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speeches/prepared-remarks-of-
richard-cordray-at-the-mortgage-servicing-field-hearing/ (describing how the new regulations will provide 
borrowers with a “fairer” process). 
 10 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 1052–1054, 1056, 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 5562–5564, 5566 (Supp. V 2012). 
 11 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed. 
Reg. at 57,200. 
 12 See id. at 57,206. 
 13 Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 10,882–83 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38). 
 14 Id. at 10,883 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39). 
 15 Id. at 10,883–84 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.40). 
 16 Id. at 10,884–85 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41). 
 17 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 1052–1056, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5562–
5566. 
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agency’s interpretation of a federal statute is evaluated under the Chevron 
doctrine.18 This Comment advocates that under the second step of Chevron, the 
Bureau’s amendments to Regulation X are proper interpretations of its 
rulemaking authority granted by the Dodd-Frank Act. 
The second question is what the amendments achieve. The amendments’ 
immediate effects are the creation of a uniform set of mortgage servicing 
standards and a large data record that is accessible to the Bureau and other 
federal agencies. The Bureau will be able to track servicer behavior and ensure 
compliance with federal laws through these data. If a servicer fails to comply 
with federal consumer protection laws, the Bureau can initiate a strong 
enforcement action.19 
Yet despite the amendments’ strong oversight effect, there are remaining 
regulatory gaps over mortgage servicers. Under the amendments, servicers are 
still able to exercise their discretion in loss mitigation decisions that will block 
borrower access to affordable loan modifications and keep borrowers exposed 
to unnecessary foreclosures.20 This Comment contends that further regulation 
is required to fill in these gaps. 
Although further regulation is needed, this Comment asserts that the 
Regulation X amendments are a move in the right direction to provide more 
transparency and accountability for consumers in mortgage servicing. Part I 
provides background on mortgage servicers’ duties and the requirements to 
which they are subject, including pooling and servicing agreements and 
RESPA. It explains what loss mitigation and foreclosure are, compares the 
outcomes for borrowers under those options, and explores how a servicer 
chooses between pursuing loss mitigation and foreclosure. This background on 
loss mitigation is important in understanding why the Regulation X 
amendments are necessary and the impact that the amendments will have on 
borrowers applying for loss mitigation options after the amendments’ 
implementation. 
 
 18 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). 
 19 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5562–5566. 
 20 See, e.g., Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 
78 Fed. Reg. at 10,884 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(a)) (declaring explicitly that mortgage servicers 
do not have a duty to provide borrowers with any loss mitigation option); see also Press Release, Nat’l 
Consumer Law Ctr., CFPB Urged to Strengthen Rules to Stem the Tide of Foreclosures, (Oct. 10, 2012), 
available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/pr-cfpb-servicing-rules-tila-respa.pdf (noting that the 
new regulations do not put any restrictions on the net present value calculations used by servicers to evaluate 
loss mitigation options). 
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Part II explains the Bureau’s enforcement, supervisory, and rulemaking 
powers. Understanding these powers is key to understanding how the Bureau 
promulgated the amendments and how it will enforce them. Part II also 
unpacks the Regulation X amendments that were promulgated under the 
Bureau’s broad rulemaking power and describes the new obligations with 
which mortgage servicers will be obligated to comply. Because the 
amendments are promulgated under the broad rulemaking requirements, Part 
III examines whether these amendments are authorized expressions of the 
Bureau’s rulemaking power. Part III concludes that the amendments are within 
the Bureau’s rulemaking power and should be given deference under the 
Chevron doctrine by a reviewing court. 
Satisfied that the rules are permissible expressions of the Bureau’s power, 
Part IV explores the amendments’ effects and identifies any remaining gaps 
requiring further regulation. Part IV asserts that the amendments’ immediate 
effects are the creation of a unifying set of standards applicable to all mortgage 
servicers and a recordkeeping system that allows the Bureau to efficiently 
enforce federal consumer protection law. The data creation and unified set of 
standards should address many of the concerns over servicer behavior that 
contributed to the wave of foreclosures during the financial crisis, as discussed 
in Part I.D. 
Part IV advocates for further regulation to fill various gaps in the 
amendments. Such regulations would include standardized net present value 
calculation procedures, a legal safe haven for servicers who opt to modify 
loans in a securitized pool, and clarification of the amendments’ preemption of 
state law and the dual-track system. Part IV explains that these additional 
regulations would be additional steps to stop servicers from pushing through 
convenient foreclosures and avoiding providing borrowers with affordable loss 
mitigation options. 
I. MORTGAGE SERVICERS: DECIDING TO IMPLEMENT A LOSS MITIGATION 
OPTION 
This Part first explains a mortgage servicer’s duties and responsibilities 
through its relationship with borrowers as compared to the servicer’s 
relationship with trustees and investors and under RESPA. This Part then 
discusses the differences between loss mitigation options and foreclosure and 
how servicers decide whether to implement a loss mitigation option or proceed 
with foreclosure. This Part concludes by discussing mortgage servicers’ role in 
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the 2007–2008 financial crisis. This background is important to understand the 
ramifications of unnecessary foreclosures and identify the aspects of mortgage 
servicing that the Regulation X amendments intend to fix and the gaps that this 
Comment argues remain to be regulated. 
A. Mortgage Servicers’ Duties and Responsibilities 
After mortgage loans are given to borrowers by lenders, the responsibilities 
for the loans are passed on to mortgage servicers. Mortgage servicing is 
performed by a variety of entities, including banks, thrifts, credit unions, and 
nonbanks.21 Although historically loan originators serviced the loans they 
produced, today over half of mortgage servicers are not affiliated with the 
originators.22 The borrower does not have any choice as to which mortgage 
servicer is charged with servicing the loan as servicers are assigned to 
borrowers, not selected by them.23 
A servicer contractually acquires the rights to a pool of private-label 
securities24 when it enters into a pooling and servicing agreement (PSA) with 
the trust that owns the residential mortgage-backed securities.25 A servicer’s 
duties, payment rights, and responsibilities for performance are outlined in the 
PSA.26 A servicer’s broad responsibility is to manage the relationships among 
 
 21 Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 10,699. 
 22 See Diane E. Thompson, Foreclosing Modifications: How Servicer Incentives Discourage Loan 
Modifications, 86 WASH. L. REV. 755, 765, 767 (2011). Some scholars believe this disconnect has contributed 
to the lack of transparency and accountability in the mortgage market. See id. at 763. 
 23 See Cordray, supra note 9 (noting that the borrower’s relationship with its servicer is not voluntary). 
 24 “Private-label securities” are pools of loans backed by mortgages that are securitized by a private 
institution, such as a brokerage firm or a bank. Mortgage Backed Securities, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/ 
answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last modified July 23, 2010). Unlike some government-sponsored enterprises, 
such as the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), private-label loans are not backed by 
the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, meaning there is no guarantee that investors will receive 
principal and interest payments on outstanding securities in a timely manner. Id.; see Frequently Asked 
Questions (FAQs), GINNIE MAE, http://www.ginniemae.gov/Pages/faq.aspx?cat=Consumer%20Education& 
subcat=All%20Subcategories&search= (last modified May 24, 2013, 8:57 AM). 
 25 See FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 1, at 2; DIANE E. THOMPSON, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 
WHY SERVICERS FORECLOSE WHEN THEY SHOULD MODIFY AND OTHER PUZZLES OF SERVICER BEHAVIOR: 
SERVICER COMPENSATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 3–4 (2009). When residential mortgages are securitized, 
thousands of loans are held in common ownership and ownership is centrally held by a trust. Id. at 3. Bonds 
are then issued from the trust and the bonds give investors the right to different categories of payment. Id. 
These different payment rights are known as “tranches.” Id. The trustee manages the securitized loan pool on 
behalf of the investors. Id. at 4. Thus, the investors and the trustee have different relationships with the 
mortgage servicer. Id.  
 26 See Thompson, supra note 22, at 783. 
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the borrower, the servicer, the guarantor, the investors, and the trustee of a 
loan.27 Servicers are contractually obligated to maximize the benefit for 
investors in a trust.28 The trustee has the right and duty to terminate a servicer’s 
contract if the servicer fails to act in the best interest of the trust.29 Servicers, 
under standard PSAs, do not have a similar contractual duty to act in the 
interest of the borrower. 
Mortgage servicers are charged with the day-to-day processing and 
monitoring of mortgage loans.30 They process monthly payments, maintain 
records, manage escrow accounts, and communicate with borrowers by 
answering borrower inquiries, distributing tax information, and responding to 
payoff requests.31 Servicers are also responsible for reporting information and 
distributing payments to investors, guarantors, and trustees.32 Servicers may 
also be responsible for payments to third parties such as tax and insurance 
payments from escrow accounts and to insurance companies for force-placed 
insurance.33 
Servicers remain responsible for a loan once the borrower has become 
delinquent in payments or otherwise defaults under the mortgage documents. 
When a borrower fails to make payments, the servicer is obligated under the 
PSA to advance principal, interest, or both to the investor plus other advances 
such as taxes and insurance.34 The servicer is also obligated under the PSA to 
initiate contact with borrower, identify possible solutions based on a 
borrower’s situation, and refer the loan to foreclosure if a solution cannot be 
found.35 If the property is foreclosed on, then the servicer is responsible for 
conducting the foreclosure process.36 
 
 27 See FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 1, at 2. 
 28 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 37). 
 29 See Thompson, supra note 22, at 765–66 (citing INDYMAC MBS INC., PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT S-12 
80–81(2007)). 
 30 See id. 
 31 See FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 1, at 3. 
 32 See id.  
 33 See id.; Making Payments to Your Mortgage Servicer, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (June 2010), http:// 
www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0190-making-payments-your-mortgage-servicer. 
 34 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
 35 See id. at 4. 
 36 See id. 
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Despite the numerous obligations for servicers in a PSA, the documents for 
private-label securities typically give limited guidance to servicers.37 Such lack 
of guidance historically has not been problematic because servicing 
requirements are generally routine.38 During good economic conditions, 
mortgage servicers have been seen as “little more than . . . processing 
centers.”39 However, when there are high default rates on loans, such as during 
the financial crisis that began in late 2007,40 mortgage servicers are responsible 
for making significant decisions, such as whether to foreclose on a large 
number of homes or pursue loss mitigation options.41 Other than the broad 
obligation to maximize the economic interest of investors, PSAs give servicers 
broad discretion in deciding between foreclosure and loss mitigation 
solutions.42 
Beyond the duties outlined in the PSA, mortgage servicers are responsible 
for duties described in RESPA. RESPA was enacted to “regulate[] settlement 
services provided in connection with residential real estate transactions and 
requires certain disclosures in mortgage transactions.”43 Required disclosures 
include the following: (1) whether the lender intends to service the mortgage 
loan, (2) transfer of the servicing rights, and (3) escrow account management 
details.44 RESPA also requires servicers to respond to qualified written 
requests, such as information requests, but has limited this responsibility to 
requests regarding the “‘servicing’ of the borrower’s mortgage loan.”45 The 
duties in RESPA, unamended by the Dodd-Frank Act, have provided limited 
protection for borrowers. 
 
 37 See Larry Cordell et al., The Incentives of Mortgage Servicing: Myths and Realities 13, 17, 21 (Fed. 
Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2008-46, 2008) (discussing the limited 
guidance to servicers regarding loss mitigation and foreclosure decisions).  
 38 Examples of routine servicing requirements include applying payments to a borrower’s account and 
passing payments on to trusts or investors. Thompson, supra note 22, at 765. 
 39 Id. at 767. 
 40 See infra Part I.C. 
 41 See Thompson, supra note 22, at 765.  
 42 See id. at 770; Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 17–18. 
 43 Leonard J. Kennedy et al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the 
Twenty-first Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1148 (2012) (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831b, 2601–2610, 2614–
2617 (2006)). 
 44 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 57,200, 57,204 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024) (citing 12 U.S.C. 
§ 2605(a)–(e)); Your Rights and the Responsibilities of the Mortgage Servicer, U.S. DEPARTMENT HOUSING & 
URB. DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/ramh/res/rightsmtgesrvcr (last 
visited July 30, 2013) [hereinafter HUD]. 
 45 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed. 
Reg. at 57,204 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(e), 2609); see also HUD, supra note 44. 
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B. Comparing Loss Mitigation Options and Foreclosure46 
If a borrower defaults on her mortgage payments, servicers are obligated 
under PSAs to maximize recovery of the remaining amount due on behalf of 
the investors. There are two ways that a servicer can maximize such recovery 
of the amount owed by the borrower: proceed with foreclosure or develop a 
loss mitigation strategy.47 
A foreclosure allows investors to recover their investments by cashing in 
on the value of the underlying property. Although recovery through a 
foreclosure may be beneficial for investors, foreclosures are harmful for 
borrowers. A foreclosure forces a borrower out of her home, oftentimes 
without allowing the borrower to recover any equity she has built up, and may 
expose the borrower to a deficiency action. On average, homes sell at 
foreclosure sales at a 27% discount to the fair market price.48 Foreclosures 
lower a borrower’s credit score and accumulate enormous legal and servicing 
fees, making future financing very difficult to find.49 One study found that the 
administrative costs of a foreclosure, including legal fees and property 
protection fees, are estimated at $7,200 per property.50 As many as ten million 
borrowers are currently at risk of foreclosure nationwide.51 
 
 46 Different industries have various views on the relationship between foreclosure and loss mitigation. 
From an investor perspective, foreclosure may be seen as a subset of loss mitigation because the foreclosure 
sale allows the investor to mitigate the loss on his investment. From a regulatory perspective, loss mitigation 
and foreclosure may be viewed as alternative approaches to a default, in which case loss mitigation is 
understood as avoiding foreclosure. The view that loss mitigation and foreclosure are two separate categories 
is the view that the Bureau takes in the Regulation X amendments and is the view that this Comment endorses. 
See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. 
10,696, 10,888 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.31). 
 47 PSAs restrict the circumstances under which loans that remain in the securitized pool can be modified 
in order to maintain the trust’s status as a passively managed entity and receive favorable tax treatment. PSAs 
generally permit modification of a loan where the loan is in default or where default is reasonably foreseeable. 
THOMPSON, supra note 25, at 5–6. A servicer can modify as many loans as it would like so long as the servicer 
is “prepared to purchase the modified loans out of the loan pool.” Id at 6.  
 48 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 5). 
 49 See id.; Julia Gordon, Dir. of Hous., Fin. & Policy, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Remarks at the CFPB Field 
Hearing on Mortgage Policy (Jan. 17, 2013), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/live-from-
atlanta-ga/.  
 50 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. at 10,858 (citing FAMILY HOUS. FUND, COST EFFECTIVENESS OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 
PREVENTION: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS (1998), available at http://www.fhfund.org/_dnld/reports/MFP_1995. 
pdf). 
 51 See Cordray, supra note 9. 
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Beyond the negative impact wrought on individual borrowers, foreclosures 
produce a negative feedback loop within communities.52 Foreclosures cause 
surrounding housing prices to drop by flooding the market with available 
properties and leaving houses as vacant lots.53 The depression of home prices 
harms a neighborhood or county by reducing property tax revenues and 
increasing the number of vacant homes available to squatters and vandals.54 
Some scholars have even gone so far as to blame foreclosures for the rise of 
the West Nile Virus since unoccupied foreclosed homes result in stagnant 
waters such as in swimming pools.55 
Loss mitigation helps borrowers avoid foreclosures.56 Although loss 
mitigation programs and policies are a long-standing practice for commercial 
real estate loans, servicers have been hesitant to adopt a strong loss mitigation 
practice in the residential context.57 Scholars argue that increasing the use of 
loss mitigation options for residential mortgages is better for investors and 
borrowers.58 First, investors can generally expect to receive a greater return 
from borrower performance of a loss mitigation option than can be recovered 
at a foreclosure sale.59 Second, loss mitigation can prevent the negative 
externalities that arise from foreclosure when borrowers are able to stay in 
their homes.60 
There are two primary types of loss mitigation options. The first are 
“workouts” and are aimed at helping borrowers stay in their homes and allow 
servicers to have an ongoing relationship with borrowers.61 Workout options 
include (1) forbearance plans (the lender temporarily lowers the borrower’s 
monthly payments to give her the opportunity to catch up on payments 
 
 52 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 6–7). 
 53 See id.; see generally Stephan Whitaker & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV, The Impact of Vacant, Tax-
Delinquent and Foreclosed Property on Sales Prices of Neighboring Homes (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 
Working Paper No. 11-23R, 2012) (finding a strong connection between vacant and foreclosed homes on the 
value of surrounding homes). 
 54 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 7). 
 55 See Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 6 (2011). 
 56 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 57,200, 57,218 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024). 
 57 See Thompson, supra note 22, at 759. 
 58 See, e.g., McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 5–6) (noting that the revenue effect of payments on 
performing loans plus high loss rates on distressed loans leaves “room for investors and banks to cut their 
losses by agreeing to workouts of troubled loans”). 
 59 See id. (manuscript at 4–5). 
 60 See id. (manuscript at 4, 6). 
 61 See Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 7. 
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although the borrower is still liable for the entire debt),62 (2) loan modifications 
(changes to the loan terms such as an extended term, reduced interest rate, 
lowered principal, or a combination),63 and (3) capitalization (adds the 
borrower’s missed back payments to the principal amount).64 
The second type of loss mitigation option is called “liquidation.”65 These 
options result in borrowers losing their homes.66 Liquidation options include 
(1) short sales (the house is sold for less than the full amount of unpaid 
principal) and (2) deeds in lieu of foreclosure (the property title is voluntarily 
transferred from the homeowner to the lender).67 
Loss mitigation options and foreclosures are not necessarily exclusive. In 
the dual-track system, a servicer may proceed with the foreclosure process 
while concurrently negotiating or implementing loss mitigation options.68 The 
dual-track system is mandated by the rating criteria for credit rating agencies69 
and the contractual requirements of most PSAs.70 A servicer who does not 
participate in the dual-track system risks breaching obligations in the PSA and 
receiving a lower credit rating.71 The dual-track requirement was originally 
instituted to minimize delay during the foreclosure process.72 Unfortunately, 
the dual-track system often leads to needless foreclosures since loss mitigation 
 
 62 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 14); Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 7. 
 63 See Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 7. 
 64 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 14). 
 65 See id. 
 66 See Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 7. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See Thompson, supra note 22, at 794–95. 
 69 See id. at 794, 799–800. Credit rating agencies use “not delaying foreclosure” as criteria for their 
residential mortgage servicer ratings. McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 45). The ratings given to mortgage 
servicers by credit rating agencies factor into how much a servicer “must bid for servicing rights” and 
influence a servicer’s “ability to acquire new mortgage servicing rights and the servicer[’s] ongoing cost of 
credit.” THOMPSON, supra note 25, at 14. See generally What Credit Ratings Are & Are Not, STANDARD & 
POOR’S, http://www.standardandpoors.com/aboutcreditratings/RatingsManual_PrintGuide.html (last visited 
Aug. 15, 2013) (explaining how Standard & Poor’s, a leading rating agency, uses credit ratings). 
 70 Trusts generally require that foreclosure options be pursued even if loss mitigation efforts have been 
initiated. See Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 13. 
 71 See Thompson, supra note 22, at 794. 
 72 See id. at 795–96 (citing Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 8 (2010) (statement of Donald 
Bisenius). The concern for delay during the foreclosure process as justification for the dual-track system is 
more relevant in fast, nonjudicial foreclosure states, such as Georgia and Texas, where a foreclosure can be 
finalized in less than six weeks, than in judicial foreclosure states with longer foreclosure times, such as 
Florida or Ohio where foreclosures take an average of 135 and 217 days respectively. See Foreclosure Laws 
and Procedures by State, REALTYTRAC, http://www.realtytrac.com/foreclosure-laws/foreclosure-laws-
comparison.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 2013). 
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and foreclosure are handled by two separate departments within mortgage 
servicers and communication between the two departments is imperfect.73 
C. Choosing Between Loss Mitigation Options and Foreclosure 
Servicers evaluate foreclosure and loss mitigation options by comparing the 
net present value (NPV) calculations for each available option.74 NPV 
represents the present value of the money that the servicer would expect to 
receive from implementing a course of action.75 Servicers consider three 
factors when calculating NPV: (1) the risk that a modified loan will redefault, 
(2) the possibility that a delinquent borrower will self-cure and resume 
payments on her own without servicer action, and (3) the discount rate to apply 
to the reduced stream of revenue from a loan modification.76 Servicers are 
virtually unrestrained by regulations or provisions in the PSAs when 
determining the values or formulae for NPV calculations.77 Servicers 
determine the likely foreclosure price, the discount rate, and “the likelihood 
that the borrower will redefault.”78 
The lack of guidance means servicers have a large amount of discretion in 
determining which values go into an NPV calculation. A servicer can 
manipulate an NPV calculation to justify a decision to pursue a loss mitigation 
option or foreclosure.79 Servicers are influenced by several factors including 
incurring additional expenditures and the probability of recouping costs, 
servicer compensation, and the existence of junior liens on the property.80 
 
 73 See Thompson, supra note 22, at 794, 830. 
 74 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 37). 
 75 See Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., Home Affordable Mortgage Program, 27 NCLC REP. BANKR. & 
FORECLOSURES EDITION 19, 19 (2009). 
 76 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 38). 
 77 See id. (manuscript at 37–38) (“PSAs give servicers of private-label RMBS a high degree of latitude in 
how to calculate [NPV].”); see also Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 22 (observing restrictions in PSAs on what 
types of loss mitigation options could be implemented but only restricting NPV calculations to the extent that 
they must maximize the investors’ profits). But see Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 18 (noting that some 
government-sponsored enterprises require servicers to use standardized software when calculating NPV). 
 78 McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 38). “Investors rarely monitor these choices or question them.” Id. 
 79 See id.  
 80 See id. (manuscript at 41). For further reading on the incentives of mortgage servicers, see id. 
(manuscript passim), which evaluates various factors on mortgage servicers’ decisions to implement loan 
modifications for default loans. See also, e.g., Thompson, supra note 22 (examining servicer incentives that 
make foreclosure more profitable than loan modifications); Cordell et al., supra note 37 (describing financial 
factors that influence mortgage servicer decisions). 
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These factors impact servicer decisions in favor of foreclosures and 
unsustainable loss mitigation options, often against the best interest of 
investors and borrowers.81 Servicers can spend less money and recoup more 
costs by foreclosing rather than modifying.82 Despite the large losses that 
servicers, investors, and borrowers may face in foreclosure, foreclosure is 
frequently less expensive than loss mitigation for servicers because the process 
is systematic and does not vary based on individual borrowers’ 
circumstances.83 
When servicers find it in their best interest to proceed with loss mitigation, 
servicers are incentivized to pursue options that forbear principal, capitalize 
arrears, and add default fees.84 These options are most attractive to servicers as 
they “pump up the unpaid balance of the loan pool” and have the lowest effect 
on the servicer’s greatest source of income: the fixed monthly fee on the 
unpaid principal balance.85 These options are ultimately ineffective because 
without a counterbalancing payment reduction, such as reduced interest or an 
extension of the term, the increased principal balance increases a borrower’s 
mortgage payments.86 Implementing improper loss mitigation options 
increases the likelihood that a borrower will redefault on her mortgage and lose 
her home.87 
 
 81 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 35) (“There is good reason to believe that servicers sometimes 
refuse to make loan modifications even when those modifications would minimize losses to investors relative 
to foreclosure.”); Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 15. When a borrower becomes delinquent, the cheapest 
option for servicers is to do nothing and allow borrowers the opportunity to self-cure. See Thompson, supra 
note 22, at 824. Borrowers can borrow money from a friend, win the lottery, or fix a difficult situation (such as 
getting a job when the cause for default was unemployment). Id. Historically, these odds are approximately 
one in four. Id. Many servicers prefer to take those odds than incur the cost of loss mitigation or foreclosure. 
Id.  
 82 See Thompson, supra note 22, at 771–72. 
 83 The foreclosure process is prescribed by statute and does not change for individual borrowers. See 
Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 15–16. Servicers do not need to hire specially trained employees to process 
foreclosures. On the other hand, employees in loss mitigation departments require special training and 
significant time to determine the appropriate loss mitigation option for each borrower. See id. at 15–16, 23; see 
also Thompson, supra note 22, at 821–23 (“Modifications are costly in terms of staff time and skill to 
implement.”). For example, a servicer must calculate NPV estimates, verify data, and coordinate its actions 
with the servicers for junior liens on the property. Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 15. 
 84 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 43); Thompson, supra note 22, at 772, 807–09, 818 
(“Servicers can . . . make more money by making short-term unsustainable payment agreements than they can 
by making long-term, sustainable modifications.”). 
 85 McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 42). 
 86 See id. (manuscript at 32). 
 87 See Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 23–24 (“A high recidivism rate directly impinges on the 
profitability of a potential loan modification . . . [because it] increases the odds that the servicer will incur 
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D. The Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 
This section discusses the economic situation that was the impetus for the 
Regulation X amendments. The large number of foreclosures during the 
financial crisis of 2007–2008 set the stage for the Dodd-Frank Act and the 
subsequent regulation of the mortgage servicing industry.88 The crisis was 
caused by the collapse of the U.S. housing market that accompanied a larger 
financial crisis on Wall Street and the worst economic panic since the Great 
Depression.89 
A housing bubble was created in the 1990s and early 2000s through the 
growth of private-label securitization caused by the easy availability of 
financing and banks’ willingness to issue a range of untraditional mortgage 
products.90 Lenders were able to make increasingly risky mortgages through 
excess liquidity, rising home prices, and an ineffectively regulated primary 
mortgage market.91 Lenders were encouraged to make risky loans because they 
were pooling and selling the loans as residential mortgage-backed securities on 
the secondary mortgage market and were able to hedge their investments with 
credit default swaps.92 Risky mortgages were often given to people at the 
lowest end of lending standards because they did not have the financial 
security to be approved for a traditional mortgage.93 Investors in securitizations 
believed they were guaranteed recovery assuming that borrowers would either 
default, in which case the lender could foreclose on the property, or that 
housing prices would increase so borrowers would refinance, giving lenders 
the opportunity to charge additional fees.94 
 
labor costs of modification again . . . .”); see also Tad Friend, Home Economics, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 4, 
2013, at 26, 27. 
 88 See CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 1. 
 89 See REAVIS, supra note 4, at 3; Kennedy et al., supra note 43, at 1142; Bill Thomas et al., Opinion, 
What Caused the Financial Crisis? WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052 
748704698004576104500524998280.html.  
 90 See Thomas et al., supra note 89. 
 91 MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT 47 (2010); Thomas et al., supra note 89.  
 92 See LEWIS, supra note 91, at 90–91. 
 93 See id. at 96–97. Some lenders even waived the requirement for borrowers to show proof of income 
before approving a mortgage. Id. The Bureau has addressed the problem of lenders not checking borrower 
income in its Ability-to-Repay rule, which institutes specific underwriting requirements. Ability-to-Repay and 
Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 35,430, 35,430, 
35,348 (June 12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026). 
 94 LEWIS, supra note 91, at 169. 
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In 2007 the housing bubble burst when borrowers were unable to pay their 
mortgages.95 The wave of defaults was met with a wave of hasty foreclosures 
because mortgage servicers were not prepared to handle the vast number of 
simultaneous defaults. Mortgage loan delinquency rates almost doubled 
between 2007 and 2009 for first-lien mortgage loans from 5.4% to 9.4%.96 The 
increased number of foreclosures depressed housing prices.97 By 2012 housing 
prices had fallen 33% from 2006, eliminating $7 trillion in homeowner equity 
and preventing homeowners from being able to refinance or sell their homes to 
pay off their mortgages.98 
The financial crisis showed that the mortgage servicing industry lacked the 
infrastructure to handle high volumes of delinquent mortgages. Mortgage 
servicers pushed to foreclose on properties before evaluating borrowers for 
loss mitigation options.99 Borrowers reported difficulties contacting servicers, 
receiving incomplete information, and having their homes foreclosed on even 
after they had entered into or agreed upon loss mitigation options.100 In January 
2013, 1.47 million foreclosed homes were listed for sale and an additional 2.3 
million foreclosed homes sat unlisted.101 In contrast, about 620,000 homes 
were foreclosed on in 2004.102 When mortgage servicers did implement loss 
mitigation options in 2007 and 2008, the majority of options increased 
borrowers’ monthly payments rather than reducing them.103 This was a “recipe 
for failure” for “cash-strapped borrowers.”104 The amendments to 
Regulation X are intended to standardize servicer communication and loss 
mitigation application procedures to prevent such a large number of 
foreclosures and the loss of homeowner equity in the future.105 
 
 95 REAVIS, supra note 4, at 4. 
 96 Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. 
Reg. 10,696, 10,700 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024). 
 97 REAVIS, supra note 4, at 4. 
 98 McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 6–7). 
 99 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 57,200, 57,251 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024). 
 100 See id. at 57,200, 57,203–04, 57,261.  
 101 McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 1). 
 102 Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 7 tbl.1. 
 103 McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 24). For example, one study showed that over 84% of loan 
modifications involved capitalized arrears even though this increased the risk of redefault for underwater 
borrowers. Id. (manuscript at 34, 62). 
 104 Id. (manuscript at 23–25). 
 105 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,696 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024). 
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II. THE REGULATION X AMENDMENTS 
This Part examines the Bureau’s enforcement and supervisory powers 
compared to the power held by regulators of federal consumer protection laws 
before the Dodd-Frank Act and surveys the requirements for mortgage services 
from the Regulation X amendments. Understanding the Bureau’s enforcement 
powers is essential to understanding how the Regulation X amendments will be 
implemented. For example, the strength of the Bureau’s powers to implement 
the recordkeeping requirements discussed in section B of this Part is key to 
understanding the data-collection effect discussed in Part IV. 
A. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 as a response to the financial 
crisis failure in 2007–2008.106 The Dodd-Frank Act created the Bureau, which 
exists as an independent agency within the Federal Reserve System.107 
Congress consolidated regulatory and rulemaking authority in the Bureau, and 
gave it strong enforcement powers to compel compliance with federal 
consumer protection law. 
1. Creating the Bureau 
Government regulation of mortgage servicers before the Dodd-Frank Act 
was almost nonexistent and the government programs were ineffective. The 
George W. Bush and Obama Administrations attempted to coordinate private 
industry efforts to modify distressed loans through voluntary incentive 
programs.108 Unfortunately, the programs were unsuccessful at increasing loan 
modifications. The success of the regulations depended on cooperation by 
 
 106 Kennedy et al., supra note 43, at 1142. 
 107 Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, Reforming Regulation in the Markets for Home Loans, 38 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 681, 701 (2011) (citing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (Supp. V 2012))). 
Despite being part of the Federal Reserve System, the Bureau has considerable independence, and the Federal 
Reserve Board does not have the authority to “stop, delay, or disapprove of a Bureau regulation.” CARPENTER, 
supra note 8, at 11. 
 108 McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 9–12). The most significant program was the Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP), implemented in 2009, which offered subsidies to servicers because it assumed 
that servicers only avoided performing loss mitigation options due to the impact to their income. Id. 
(manuscript at 19, 25). HAMP was not found to be conclusively successful because 42% of borrowers have 
failed to graduate to permanent loan modifications. Id. (manuscript at 34 n.105).  
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servicers on unattractive terms and “servicers were unwilling to swallow large, 
certain write-downs instead of gambling on [losses in] foreclosure.”109 
Regulation of mortgage servicers before the Dodd-Frank Act did not 
provide sufficient oversight of servicer behavior. As described in Part I.A, 
RESPA focused on mandating disclosures.110 Additionally, rulemaking and 
enforcement authority over federal consumer protection law was spread 
between seven federal agencies: five banking regulators, the Federal Trade 
Commission, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.111 The 
Federal Reserve Board held rulemaking powers, and enforcement authority 
was diffused among the bank regulators, FTC, and HUD.112 Although the 
banking regulators had strong supervisory powers over depository institutions, 
such as banks, nondepository institutions and mortgage servicers were subject 
to limited, if any, supervision.113 
Congress created the Bureau to be the primary regulator of entities 
providing consumer financial products and services.114 The Dodd-Frank Act 
consolidates power in the Bureau from the seven agencies previously charged 
with supervising federal consumer protection law.115 The consolidation is a 
grant of new authority, not a transfer of power from the existing agencies.116 
The federal agencies retain regulatory power over federal consumer protection 
law and are expected to act in conjunction with the Bureau on enforcement 
actions.117 An agency may recommend and, if the Bureau fails to take action, 
 
 109 Id. (manuscript at 11); see also Thompson, supra note 22, at 829. (“As long as servicers can choose 
not to perform modification, they will, by and large, choose the path of least resistance—foreclosures and 
temporary modifications that strip wealth from both investors and homeowners.”).  
 110 See supra Part I.A; see also Kennedy et al., supra note 43, at 1148. 
 111 CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 2. The five banking regulators included the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, and the Office of Thrift Supervision. Id. 
 112 Id. at 4. 
 113 See id. at 2–4. For example, the FTC had limited supervisory authority and could not institute 
reporting requirements on nondepository institutions. Id. at 3. The FTC could only regularly examine these 
institutions with “ex post enforcement,” leaving them fairly unchecked. Id. 
 114 See id. at 9; John D. Wright, Dodd-Frank’s “Abusive” Standard: A Call for Certainty, 8 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J., no. 2, 2011, at 164, 165. Entities providing consumer financial product services include nonbank 
entities such as “mortgage originators, brokers, and servicers; private student lenders; [and] payday lenders.” 
Kennedy et al., supra note 43, at 1146–47. 
 115 See CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 2, 4, 9; Michael T. Escue, First CFPB Public Enforcement Action 
Offers Insight into Agency Expectations, 248 N.Y. L.J., Aug. 29, 2012, at 3. 
 116 See Escue, supra note 115. 
 117 See, e.g., id. (describing CFPB’s enforcement action against Capital One Bank for $160 million “taken 
in coordination with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.”); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1015, 12 U.S.C. § 5495 (Supp. V 2012). 
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initiate its own enforcement action for violations of federal consumer 
protection law.118 The consolidation of authority in the Bureau ensures that a 
single federal agency has adequate authority to efficiently and consistently 
enforce federal regulation over all industry entities. 
2. The Bureau’s Powers 
The Bureau has primary rulemaking authority over many federal consumer 
protection laws, including RESPA.119 The Dodd-Frank Act outlines specific 
rules the Bureau should enact and endows the Bureau with broad rulemaking 
power to “prescribe rules . . . as may be necessary . . . to enable to Bureau to 
administer and carry out the purposes and objectives of the Federal consumer 
laws.”120 Beyond the broad grant of rulemaking power, the Dodd-Frank Act is 
relatively silent about the “substantive breadth of the Bureau’s rulemaking 
authority.”121 
The Bureau has stronger enforcement powers than any single federal 
agency regulating consumer financial services before the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Important for the Regulation X amendments is the Bureau’s ability to 
implement recordkeeping requirements on supervised entities.122 The Bureau’s 
enforcement powers include the ability to demand the production of any 
documentary material or tangible things, require sworn testimony, file written 
reports, conduct hearings and adjudication proceedings, litigate civil actions, 
issue temporary cease and desist orders, and refer criminal matters to the 
Department of Justice.123 
Additionally, the Bureau has the power to implement significant relief 
measures for violations of federal consumer protection laws. Relief may 
 
 118 CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 3 
(2011), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFPB-Accountability-fact-sheet-6-11.pdf. 
 119 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5512(b)(4)(a), 5581(b)(7); CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 1. Although the Bureau has 
acquired primary rulemaking authority over most federal consumer protection laws, it does not have authority 
over all federal consumer laws. For example, HUD is the primary rulemaking authority under the Fair Housing 
Act. 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (2006). 
 120 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(1). 
 121 Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 107, at 705. Some practitioners and academics have expressed 
concern for the seeming lack of oversight of the Bureau’s regulations. See Wright, supra note 114, at 165. 
 122 See 12 U.S.C. § 5514(b)(7)(B). 
 123 See id. §§ 5562–5564, 5566; see also Laureen E. Galeoto et al., The Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau: The New Sheriff in Town, 129 BANKING L.J. 702, 706 (2012); KING & SPALDING, CLIENT ALERT: 
CFPB PROPOSES CHANGES TO REGULATIONS Z AND X (2012), available at http://www.kslaw.com/ 
imageserver/KSPublic/library/publication/ca081312b.pdf. 
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include rescission of contracts, refund of money, return of property, restitution, 
public notice of the violation, and limits on what functions an entity can 
perform.124 The monetary penalties are steep and range from $5,000 to 
$1 million per day for every day an entity violates a federal consumer 
protection law.125 
B. Amendments to Regulation X 
The Bureau proposed nine amendments to Regulation X on August 9, 
2012, under notice and comment rulemaking.126 The rule was finalized on 
January 17, 2013, with an effective date of January 10, 2014.127 The 
amendments change nine areas of mortgage servicing with the intent of 
creating greater accountability and transparency for consumers.128 Four of the 
amendments are promulgated under the Bureau’s broad rulemaking power.129 
These four amendments are the most important for purposes of this Comment’s 
analysis. 
Alongside creating transparency and accountability, the amendments to 
Regulation X aim to consolidate existing federal requirements for mortgage 
 
 124 See 12 U.S.C. § 5565. 
 125 See id. § 5565(c)(2); see also Galeoto et al., supra note 123, at 706. 
 126 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 57,200, 57,200–02 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024); Diana Olick, Big 
Banks Pushed to Outsource Mortgages, CNBC (Aug. 13, 2012, 2:32 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/48648395. 
The amendments apply to “[f]ederal related mortgage loans,” which include any loan secured by a first or 
subordinate lien on residential property and installment land contracts, with a few exceptions. See Mortgage 
Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. 10,696, 
10,873–74 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.2(b)). The regulation generally excludes open 
lines of credit, business-purpose loans, and temporary loans, such as construction loans. See id. at 10,698. 
“Open-end lines of credit ([HELOCs]) are generally exempt from” Regulation X’s requirements, though they 
are regulated under Regulation Z, the enacting regulation for the Truth in Lending Act. Id. at 10,698, 10,721. 
The Bureau exempted HELOCs from Regulation X because HELOCs are more similar to open-end consumer 
products, such as credit cards, and have different servicing risks from closed-end mortgage loans. Id. at 
10,721. 
 127 Id. at 10,696, 10,708. 
 128 See id. at 10,696; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PUTTING THE ‘SERVICE’ BACK IN MORTGAGE 
SERVICING: NO SURPRISES, NO RUNAROUNDS (2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201208_ 
cfpb_mortgage_servicing_fact_sheet.pdf; see also Cordray, supra note 9 (noting that the rules are intended to 
provide a fairer process for borrowers at risk of losing their homes). 
 129 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5512(b)(1); 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage 
Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed. Reg. at 57,206. The four amendments promulgated under the broad rulemaking 
power are (1) general servicing policies, procedures, and requirements; (2) early intervention with delinquent 
borrowers; (3) continuity of contact with delinquent borrowers; and (4) loss mitigation procedures. Mortgage 
Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. at 10,696. 
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servicers.130 Under the preexisting terms of RESPA, servicers must meet 
specific requirements for various types of loans and the corresponding entities 
that sponsor those loans.131 These include servicing guidelines for government-
sponsored enterprises, government insured program guidelines, contractual 
agreements with investors and trustees for private-label loans, and bank- or 
institution-specific policies.132 Along with consolidating these existing 
requirements, the amendments also incorporate some of the mortgage servicing 
requirements that were part of the National Mortgage Settlement.133 These 
requirements will persist alongside Regulation X and the amendments are not 
intended to preempt these restraints.134 The Bureau’s incorporation and 
consideration of existing restrictions into Regulation X’s framework is 
intended to create a more efficient set of requirements applicable to all 
mortgage servicers. 
The four amendments promulgated under the Bureau’s broad rulemaking 
power have three aims: (1) requiring servicers to keep records of borrower 
information and communication, (2) facilitating and recording communication 
between the borrower and the servicer, and (3) establishing uniform loss 
mitigation application review procedures.135 The Bureau anticipates that the 
transparency and accountability from these requirements will help borrowers 
avoid unnecessary foreclosures.136 This Comment argues in Part IV that the 
immediate effects of these amendments are the creation of uniform industry 
standards and collection of data on servicer behavior. This Comment also 
 
 130 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed. 
Reg. at 57,209. 
 131 Id. at 57,204–05. 
 132 Id.  
 133 Id. at 57,205. See generally PHILIP A. LEHMAN, NAT’L MORTG. SETTLEMENT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
OF MULTISTATE/FEDERAL SETTLEMENT OF FORECLOSURE MISCONDUCT CLAIMS (2012), available at https:// 
d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/NMS_Executive_Summary-7-23-2012.pdf (explaining the background, terms, 
and resulting payments of the National Mortgage Settlement). The Settlement was a joint action by state 
attorneys general and various federal agencies, including HUD, against the five leading bank mortgage 
servicers for their loan-servicing practices and foreclosure processes, especially robo-signing affidavits. Id. at 
1. The five bank mortgage servicers were Bank of America Corp., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Wells Fargo & 
Co., Citigroup Inc., and Ally Financial Inc. See NAT’L MORTG. SETTLEMENT, FACT SHEET: MORTGAGE 
SERVICING SETTLEMENT 2 (2012), available at https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/Mortgage_Servicing_ 
Settlement_Fact_Sheet.pdf. The Settlement resulted in $25 billion in monetary sanctions and relief, as well as 
comprehensive changes to mortgage loan-servicing requirements. See id. The Settlement is not federal law and 
has no federal significance beyond the parallel promulgation by the Bureau. 
 134 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed. 
Reg. at 57,205. 
 135 See id. at 57,205, 57,209–10. 
 136 See 5id. at 57,209–10, 57,274. 
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asserts that the amendments leave gaps—such as a flexible NPV 
requirement—that leave borrowers exposed to improper loss mitigation 
options. 
1. Recordkeeping Requirements 
The first amendment establishes general servicing procedures aimed at 
implementing recordkeeping requirements.137 The required policies should 
facilitate compliance with the communication requirements and the loss 
mitigation procedures in the other amendments.138 The records and procedures 
in this amendment are subject to supervision by the Bureau and federal 
regulators.139 Under the first amendment, the servicer must keep a servicing 
file for each mortgage loan account while the servicer is actively servicing the 
loan.140 The servicing file must contain specific documents, including a copy 
of the security instrument and copies of information provided for loss 
mitigation applications.141 Servicers are obligated to keep this file and 
documentation of their actions with respect to a borrower’s loan account for at 
least one year after the mortgage is either discharged or transferred.142 
Requiring servicers to have copies of accurate information aims to avoid some 
of the confusion between servicers and borrowers that contributed to the 
unnecessary foreclosures during the financial crisis.143 
2. Facilitating and Recording Servicer–Borrower Communication 
The Bureau requires servicers to implement early contact, single point of 
contact, and information access procedures under the first, second, and third 
amendments.144 These requirements create a record of servicer–borrower 
communication. Servicer procedures implemented under this section are 
 
 137 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,882–83 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38). 
 138 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed. 
Reg. at 57,248, 57,280, 57,304. 
 139 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. at 10,697–98. 
 140 Id. at 10,883 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38(c)). 
 141 See id. 
 142 Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38(c)(1)). 
 143 See supra Part I.D (discussing how servicer behavior exacerbated the wave of foreclosures resulting 
from the financial crisis of 2007–2008). 
 144 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. at 10,882–84 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38–.40). 
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subject to supervision by the Bureau and regulators, but borrowers do not have 
a private right of action for enforcement.145 
The second amendment requires all servicers to initiate early contact with 
delinquent borrowers or a borrower’s agent.146 The amendment has two 
communication components: an oral notice of delinquency and a written notice 
with information.147 When giving the oral notice,148 the servicer must notify 
the borrower that the payment is late or missing and, if applicable, that loss 
mitigation options are available.149 The initial conversation about a borrower’s 
delinquency will allow a servicer to begin to identify appropriate loss 
mitigation options.150 The written notice151 must include specific information, 
including a statement encouraging the borrower to contact the servicer, and a 
statement of loss mitigation options that may be available.152 Written notice 
provides the borrower with consistent information and a reference to detailed 
information that can be taken to a third-party advisor, such as a housing 
counselor.153 
The third amendment implements staffing procedures that assign staff 
members to delinquent borrowers contacted via written notice under the 
second amendment.154 The servicer has the discretion to assign a single person 
or a team of personnel to a borrower.155 Personnel assigned to delinquent 
 
 145 See id. at 10,698. 
 146 See id. at 10,895 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39(a) cmt. 4). 
 147 See id. at 10,883 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39(a)–(b)). 
 148 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39(a)). Oral notice must be given over the phone or in 
person no later than thirty-six days after a missed payment date. Id. Oral servicer–borrower contact must be 
done over the phone or in person, but cannot be made with a phone-delivered recording. See id. 
 149 See id. Notification of loss mitigation options is applicable, for example, where the servicer learns of a 
change in the borrower’s financial circumstances. See id. at 10,894–95 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 
§ 1024.39(a) cmt. 3(i)(A)). 
 150 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 57,200, 57,252 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024).  
 151 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. at 10,883 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39(b)). The written notice must be sent to a borrower 
that is still delinquent no later than the forty-five days after the missed payment (ten days after the thirty-six-
day oral communication period has expired). Id. 
 152 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39(b)(2)). 
 153 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed. 
Reg. at 57,255. 
 154 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. at 10,883–84 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.40(a)(1)). A comment to the amendment broadens 
a servicer’s responsibility to the “borrower” to include an agent authorized to act on the borrower’s behalf, 
such as a housing counselor or attorney. See id. at 10,895–96 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.40(a) cmt. 1). 
 155 See id. at 10,896 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.40(a) cmt. 2). 
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borrowers are responsible for answering borrower inquiries and helping 
borrowers navigate loss mitigation options.156 
Under the third amendment, the assigned personnel must be able to access 
a complete record of the borrower’s payment history and all written 
information the borrower has provided to the servicer or prior servicers as part 
of a loss mitigation application, filed in accordance with the first 
amendment.157 This access enables the personnel to perform a designated list 
of functions that provide borrowers with information about loss mitigation 
options, loss mitigation applications, and foreclosures.158 Similarly, the first 
amendment requires servicers to maintain policies that provide the servicing 
parties with accurate information, including timely and accurate responses to 
borrower inquiries and proper loss mitigation application evaluation.159 The 
objectives are considered achieved when a servicer retains and has easy access 
to “accurate and current” documents reflecting servicer action and borrower 
information.160 
The Bureau anticipates that early outreach to borrowers and an assigned 
point of contact within the servicer will help borrowers avoid foreclosure.161 
Oral and written contact at an early stage of delinquency notifies the borrower 
of her options, giving her an opportunity to either self-correct a mistake, 
consider and apply for loss mitigation options in accordance with the fourth 
amendment requirements, or prepare for the foreclosure process.162 Assigning 
personnel to a delinquent borrower gives the borrower a certain point for 
communicating with the servicer and makes someone within the servicer 
personally accountable to the individual. The Bureau believes that borrower 
delinquencies will be solved more efficiently if personnel have access to 
 
 156 See id. at 10,883–84 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.40(a)(2)). A servicer must assign personnel to 
delinquent borrowers by the time provided for written notice (no later than the forty-fifth day of delinquency). 
See id. at 10,884. Servicer personnel must be available via telephone to give live responses or the servicer 
should have procedures that ensure a live response in a “timely manner.” Id. The assigned personnel remain 
available to the borrower until the borrower has made two consecutive mortgage payments in accordance with 
the terms of a permanent loss mitigation agreement. See id.  
 157 See id. at 10,884 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.40(b)(2)). 
 158 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.40(b)). 
 159 See id. at 10,882–83 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38(b)(1)–(2)). 
 160 See id. at 10,882, 10,893 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38(b)(1)(iv) cmt. 1). For example, the 
servicer’s policies should show how a servicer identifies the loss mitigation options that are available to 
various borrowers and its threshold for borrower eligibility. See id. at 10,893 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 
§ 1024.38(b)(2)(ii) cmt. 1). 
 161 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 57,200, 57,261 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024). 
 162 See id. at 57,251. 
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borrower information.163 Coupled with the recordkeeping requirements in the 
first amendment, the communication procedures in the second and third 
amendment may avoid the mishandling of borrower’s loss mitigation 
applications caused by servicers’ improper infrastructure and unaccountable 
personnel during the financial crisis.164 
3. Loss Mitigation Procedures 
The fourth amendment provides a uniform set of procedures for processing 
loss mitigation applications.165 The amendment establishes a timeline intended 
to prevent hasty foreclosures, provide borrowers and servicers with sufficient 
time to apply for and review loss mitigation options, and limit the dual-track 
system.166 The requirements in this amendment are intended to work in 
conjunction with the early borrower contact and continuity-of-contact 
requirements to avoid burdening servicers.167 Individual borrowers can enforce 
the loss mitigation provisions in the fourth amendment through private action 
under RESPA. 168 
The amendment limits servicer foreclosure action. Servicers are prohibited 
from issuing a notice or filing required for any judicial or nonjudicial 
foreclosure process until the borrower has been delinquent for 120 days.169 
This 120-day “buffer” is in place for all borrowers, regardless of whether they 
submit a loss mitigation application.170 Additionally, servicers cannot move for 
a foreclosure judgment or order of sale, or conduct a foreclosure sale if a 
borrower submits a complete loss mitigation application after the first 
foreclosure notice or filing but more than thirty-seven days before a 
foreclosure sale.171 The servicer cannot continue with or complete the 
foreclosure process unless one of three events has occurred: (1) the servicer 
 
 163 See id. at 57,261. 
 164 See id. 
 165 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,884–85 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41). 
 166 See id.; 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 
Fed. Reg. at 57,266–67. 
 167 See id. at 57,267. 
 168 See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f) (2006); Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. at 10,884 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(a)). 
 169 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. at 10,884–85 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f)(1)). 
 170 See Gordon, supra note 49. 
 171 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. at 10,884–85 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(g)). 
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sends the borrower a notice that the borrower is ineligible for all loss 
mitigation options and an appeal is not available, not requested, or denied, 
(2) the borrower rejects the servicer’s loss mitigation option, or (3) the 
borrower fails to perform under a loss mitigation option agreement.172 
The amendment establishes steps for the review and evaluation of 
completed loss mitigation applications.173 A servicer must evaluate a borrower 
for all options for which the borrower may be qualified⎯both workout and 
liquidation options.174 However, servicers control the eligibility criteria for loss 
mitigation options.175 Additionally, “[s]ervicers are free to follow ‘waterfalls’ 
established by an investor to determine eligibility for particular loss mitigation 
options.”176 The borrower has the right under the fourth amendment to receive 
written notice and participate in the appeals process for the denial of any “trial 
or permanent loan modification option available to the borrower.”177 The 
written notice must include “the specific reasons” for the servicer’s 
determination, the borrower’s right to appeal,178 and any inputs used to make 
an NPV calculation to the extent such inputs were the basis for the denial.179 
The amendment neither mandates the outcome of loss mitigation evaluations 
 
 172 Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f)(2), (g)). In these instances, the servicer has the 
responsibility to inform counsel not to proceed with the foreclosure. See id. at 10,698. 
 173 See id. at 10,884 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(b)). The Bureau defines a “loss mitigation 
application” as an oral or written request for a loss mitigation option (defined as an alternative to foreclosure) 
accompanied by information required by a servicer. Id. at 10,876 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.31). A 
complete application is an application that includes “all the information the servicer regularly obtains and 
considers” for evaluating loss mitigation options. 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) 
Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed. Reg. 57,200, 57,268 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1024). The Bureau makes it clear that a servicer “shall not evade the requirement[s]” of Section 
1024.41 because the application is incomplete and shall use “reasonable diligence” to complete the 
application. Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. at 10,884 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(c)(2)(i)–(ii)). These procedures only apply to 
mortgage loans securing a borrower’s principal residence. See id. at 10,698. 
 174 See id. at 10,884 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(c)(1)(i)). See generally supra Part I.B. 
 175 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. at 10,827. 
 176 Id. at 10,698. A “waterfall” is an evaluation rule that prioritizes loss mitigation options. Id. at 10,827. 
For example, if loss mitigation options are ranked one through six and a borrower is eligible for an option 
higher on the list, then he is deemed denied for the lower options. Id.  
 177 See id. at 10,885 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(d)(1), (h)(1)). The right to appeal the denial of 
a trial or permanent loan modification option is only available to borrowers whose competed loss mitigation 
application were received at least ninety days before a scheduled foreclosure sale. See id. (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. § 1024.41(h)(1)). 
 178 Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(d)). 
 179 See id. at 10,897 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(d)(1) cmt. 2). 
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nor imposes a duty on servicers to provide any borrower with loss mitigation 
options.180 
III.  AGENCY RULEMAKING UNDER THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE 
The Regulation X amendments are demonstrations of the Bureau’s 
interpretation of its authority to create and enforce rules for consumer 
protection under RESPA.181 The promulgation of the amendments under the 
Bureau’s broad rulemaking power raises the question of whether the issuance 
of these rules is permissible.182 This Comment concludes that requiring 
recordkeeping systems, policies for contact with delinquent borrowers, and 
loss mitigation evaluation procedures are an authorized exercise of the 
Bureau’s broad rulemaking power. 
For an agency regulation to be valid, the regulation must be consistent with 
the congressional statute under which the agency was given rulemaking 
authority.183 An attack on a regulation’s validity can be aimed at the substance 
of the rule or at how the rule was promulgated procedurally. Both attacks 
require an analysis of the agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers 
under the Chevron doctrine, a two-step test used by courts to determine 
whether a court should grant deference to an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute.184 Under Chevron, an agency regulation will be binding unless a court 
finds that the regulation is “procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in 
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”185 
 
 180 See id. at 10,884 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(a)(1)). 
 181 See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k)(1)(E) (Supp. V 2012); Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. at 10,703. 
 182 Cf. Wright, supra note 114, at 164–66. 
 183 Cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840–41 (1984) (interpreting 
the Clean Air amendments which were implemented by the EPA); Haug v. Bank of Am., N.A., 317 F.3d 832, 
834–35 (8th Cir. 2003) (interpreting RESPA, which HUD had implemented); Bank of Am., N.A. v. F.D.I.C., 
244 F.3d 1309, 1311, 1321 (11th Cir. 2001) (interpreting the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act that the FDIC was charged with overseeing) (“An administrative agency should attempt to 
conduct its actions . . . within the statutory limits that Congress has placed on its authority.”); Fed. Land Bank 
of Springfield v. Farm Credit Admin., 676 F. Supp. 1239, 1241–42 (D. Mass. 1987) (interpreting the Farm 
Credit Act which authorized the Farm Credit Administration to promulgated rules). 
 184 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43; United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) 
(“[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it 
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and 
that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”); Evan J. 
Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1272, 1276–77 (2008) (“[W]here agency decision-
making processes satisfy all of the leading rationales for deference, the Court applies Chevron.”). 
 185 Mead, 533 U.S. at 227 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844). 
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The first step in Chevron is to determine whether Congress has directly 
spoken to an issue.186 Congress has directly spoken to an issue when 
Congress’s intent is clear and unambiguous.187 If Congress’s intent is clear and 
unambiguous, the inquiry ends and the agency interpretation is given deference 
only to the extent that it enacts the unambiguous congressional intent.188 A 
court may use traditional tools of statutory interpretation to determine 
congressional intent under step one.189 A court will reject an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute that conflicts with congressional intent190 or the plain 
language of a statute.191 
If Congress has not directly spoken to the issue, then the court will ask if 
the agency’s regulation is “based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”192 Courts will uphold an agency regulation as a permissible 
construction of the statute so long as the regulation is “sufficiently rational”193 
and is not “arbitrary [and] capricious.”194 Courts rarely strike down an agency 
action under the second step.195 Deference to an agency’s interpretation is 
especially appropriate when the implementing agency is interpreting a new 
statute196 or the implementing agency has primary responsibility for the 
underlying matter.197 Additionally, courts look for an “express delegation of 
authority” to an agency to fill a statutory gap.198 This Comment argues that the 
 
 186 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. at 843 n.9.  
 190 Grunbeck v. Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y., FSB, 74 F.3d 331, 336 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 
at 843 n.9). 
 191 Haug v. Bank of Am., N.A., 317 F.3d 832, 835–36 (8th Cir. 2003); Fed. Land Bank of Springfield v. 
Farm Credit Admin., 676 F. Supp. 1239, 1250 (D. Mass. 1987) (denying agency deference for issuing a 
regulation that went against specific criteria).  
 192 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 193 Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985). See Home Mortg. 
Bank v. Ryan, 986 F.2d 372, 376 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844)). 
 194 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
 195 Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, 
and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 775 (2008). 
 196 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see also Cooper Dev. 
Co., v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 762 F. Supp. 1145, 1151–52 (D.N.J. 1991) (citing Atl. Richfield Co. v. U.S. 
Dept. of Energy, 769 F.2d 771, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).  
 197 Home Mortg. Bank, 986 F.2d at 376 (citing Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n, 470 U.S. at 125). 
 198 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44, 865–66; Glover v. Standard Fed. Bank, 283 F.3d 953, 961 (8th Cir. 
2002) (finding Congress did expressly delegate authority to HUD when it authorized HUD to prescribe rules 
necessary to achieve the purposes of RESPA); see also Criddle, supra note 184, at 1275 (grounding the 
Supreme Court’s Chevron analysis in five factors, including the agency as the delegated authority and agency 
expertise). 
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Regulation X amendments are substantively and procedurally valid under 
Chevron’s second step. 
A. Substantive Validity 
An agency regulation’s substantive validity depends on whether the agency 
has properly interpreted the authority granted to it by Congress. The Bureau 
relies on three sections of RESPA, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, as its 
legal authority for promulgating the amendments to Regulation X.199 One 
provision of RESPA provides, “A servicer of a federally related mortgage shall 
not . . . fail to comply with any other obligation found by the Bureau . . . to be 
appropriate to carry out the consumer protection purposes of this chapter.”200 
The other two provisions permit the Bureau to “establish any requirements”201 
and “prescribe such rules and regulations”202 necessary to achieve RESPA’s 
purpose. 
The amendments will be upheld under the first step of Chevron if RESPA’s 
language shows Congress’s clear and unambiguous intent. However, the 
amendments do not warrant agency deference under the first step of Chevron 
because neither RESPA’s plain language nor statutory context reveals 
Congress’s clear and unambiguous intent. RESPA instructs the Bureau to 
promulgate any rules or regulations that are necessary to carry out the statute’s 
consumer protection purpose.203 Typically, courts have found that broad 
language does not have the “precision necessary” to determine congressional 
intent under the first step of Chevron.204 Success under step one depends on 
whether the language in a statute “compel[s] any given interpretation.”205 
 
 199 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(j)(3), (k)(1)(E), 2617(a) (Supp. V 2012). 
 200 Id. § 2605(k)(1)(E). 
 201 Id. § 2605(j)(3). 
 202 Id. § 2617(a). 
 203 Id. §§ 2605(j)(3), (k)(1)(E), 2617(a). 
 204 See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 708, 711 (2011) 
(citing United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 305 (2009)) (interpreting the word “student” and 
ultimately deferring to the Treasury Department’s interpretation of FICA under the second step of Chevron 
and engaging in a multifactor analysis for the first Chevron step that is unique to review of tax regulation). See 
also Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 525 (2009) (finding that there was necessarily ambiguity 
in the term “visitorial powers”); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125–26 
(1985) (finding no plain meaning for “modify” where it could be interpreted both broadly and narrowly). 
 205 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 860 (1984). “We are not 
persuaded that parsing of general terms in the text of the statute will reveal an actual intent of Congress.” Id. at 
861. 
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Courts are permitted to use traditional tools of statutory interpretation 
under step one to examine whether Congress has expressed its clear intent, 
including examining the statute as a whole. The remaining statutory text does 
not illuminate an unambiguous meaning of “any . . . obligation . . . to be 
appropriate to carry out the consumer protection purposes of this chapter.”206 
For example, RESPA’s stated purpose is to provide effective disclosures, 
eliminate referral fees, reduce the amount homeowner’s put into escrow, and 
modernize local land title recordkeeping.207 RESPA’s text as a whole does not 
address whether Congress intended for the Bureau to implement regulations 
about loss mitigation application procedures or contact with delinquent 
borrowers.208 
The analysis moves to the second step of Chevron. Notably, deference to an 
agency’s interpretation under the second step is escalated when the case 
involves construction “of a new statute by its implementing agency”209 or 
where the agency has primary responsibility for the underlying matter.210 For 
example, in Home Mortgage Bank v. Ryan, the Tenth Circuit noted that the 
Office of Thrift Supervisors’ interpretation of a new loan regulation was 
subject to “considerable deference” since the agency had the primary 
responsibility for regulating savings and loans.211 Congress delegated primary 
rulemaking authority over federal consumer financial protection laws, and 
specifically over RESPA, to the Bureau.212 A reviewing court would give the 
Bureau deference based on that delegation, as in Home Mortgage Bank.213 
Broad deference under the second step of Chevron is especially appropriate 
where courts find that Congress has intentionally left a statutory gap for an 
 
 206 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k)(1)(E).  
 207 See 12 U.S.C. § 2601(b). 
 208 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44, 861–62. 
 209 Atl. Richfield Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 769 F.2d 771, 789–90 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (showing heightened deference to agency 
interpretations of new statutes even before Chevron). Although RESPA is not a “new” statute, it has 
undergone significant changes under the Dodd-Frank Act. See e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 2605 (2006), amended by the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §  1463, 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k) (Supp. V 2012). 
 210 Home Mortg. Bank v. Ryan, 986 F.2d 372, 376 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985)). 
 211 Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 212 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5512 (Supp. V 
2012). 
 213 See Home Mortg. Bank, 986 F.2d at 376–77 (granting deference to the Office of Thrift Supervisors’ 
interpretation based on the OTS’s primary authority over savings associations). 
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agency with superior industry-specific expertise to fill.214 So long as an 
agency’s interpretation “fills a gap or defines a term” in a statute reasonably 
and is not in conflict with the statute’s text, then a court will give deference to 
the agency’s interpretation.215 RESPA instructs the Bureau to carry out “any” 
requirements necessary to achieve the consumer purposes of RESPA, which 
demonstrates an explicit gap.216 The Bureau has industry-specific knowledge, 
demonstrated by the economic and financial expertise it acquired upon hiring 
key economic and political experts and from the extensive consumer and 
market research it has accumulated since its inception.217 The Bureau has 
chosen to fill the gap with regulations over mortgage servicers requiring 
communication and loss mitigation procedures. Additionally, the Bureau’s 
amendments requiring early contact, continual contact, and loss mitigation 
procedures do not conflict with the plain meaning of “any regulation” 
appropriate to carry out consumer protection purposes.218 
 
 214 Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 158–59 (2007) (considering the agency’s 
expertise and knowledge in regulated area in awarding agency deference); Chevron U.S.A. V. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) (describing the separation of expertise between judges and 
agencies with regard to statutory interpretation); Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 383 F.3d 49, 61 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (considering HUD’s “expertise regarding the market for federally related home mortgage loans” in 
awarding Chevron deference to a HUD regulation). 
 215 Kruse, 383 F.3d at 55 (citing Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 457 (1998)); see, e.g., Fla. 
Manufactured Hous. Ass’n, v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d 1565, 1577 (11th Cir. 1995) (deferring to HUD’s 
interpretation of the Manufactured Housing Act where the statute required HUD to consider certain factors, 
but with no precise indication how, and HUD’s interpretation furthered the Manufactured Housing Act’s 
purpose). 
 216 12 U.S.C. §§ 2605(j)(3), 2617(a) (Supp. V 2012); see, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand 
X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 996–97 (2005) (finding an explicit gap in the Communications Act for the 
Federal Communications Commission to define “telecommunications-service offerors” where the statute’s 
definitions made no distinctions between various interpretations); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 865–66 (deciding 
Congress left a gap in the Clean Air Act for the EPA to define “stationary source”); see also United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001) (noting that a “very good indicator” of “Chevron treatment is express 
congressional authorizations to engage in the rulemaking . . . process that produces the regulations . . . for 
which deference is claimed”). 
 217 For example, the Bureau’s director, Richard Cordray, is the former Ohio Attorney General, who 
recently replaced Elizabeth Warren, a bankruptcy law professor at Harvard. See Adam Sorensen, Obama 
Passes Over Warren, Names Deputy to Run Consumer Agency, TIME (July 17, 2011), http://swampland.time. 
com/2011/07/17/obama-picks-former-ohio-ag-warren-deputy-to-head-consumer-bureau/; About Rich Cordray, 
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/about-rich-
cordray/ (last visited Aug 16, 2013). 
 218 Cf. Haug v. Bank of Am., N.A. 317 F.3d 832, 835–36, 838–40 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that HUD’s 
interpretation of RESPA went beyond RESPA’s plain meaning although the case was remanded). 
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Courts consider factors other than an agency’s expertise at Chevron’s 
second step to determine if an agency’s interpretation is reasonable.219 For 
example, in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Cisneros, the Sixth 
Circuit upheld a HUD interpretation of broad language in the Fair Housing Act 
because HUD’s regulation was directly connected to the Fair Housing Act’s 
purpose to ensure borrowers have access to affordable housing.220 RESPA, as 
amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, is focused on protecting consumers from 
harmful actions by mortgage servicers and establishing mortgage servicers’ 
duties to borrowers.221 It is no less reasonable that the Bureau’s regulations of 
early borrower contact, continuity of contact, and uniform loss mitigation 
procedures are directly connected to RESPA’s aim to promote consumer 
protection in mortgage transactions.222 
The Bureau’s interpretation of “any regulation necessary” as servicing and 
loss mitigation procedures, recordkeeping requirements, and delinquent-
borrower contact policies should be given deference under the second step of 
Chevron. Aside from the implicit broad deference under Chevron’s second 
step, the Bureau has used its industry expertise to fill in specific gaps in an 
industry where it is the primary regulator. Additionally, the amendments 
further the consumer protection purposes of RESPA, making them worthy of a 
court’s deference. 
B. Procedural Validity 
Procedurally an agency rule is valid if it meets the requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)223 and any additional requirements 
expressly stated in the granting statute.224 The Dodd-Frank Act requires Bureau 
 
 219 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1864 (2013) (stating that the ultimate question under 
Chevron is, “simply, whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority”); see also 
NSK Ltd v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d. 1291, 1296–97 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2002) (providing a nonexclusive 
list of factors a court may use during the second-step, including “the express terms of the provisions at issue, 
the objectives of those provisions and the objectives of the . . . scheme as a whole”). 
 220 52 F.3d 1351, 1359 (6th Cir. 1995) (deciding regulating property insurance was directly connected to 
the ability to purchase a home). 
 221 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,709 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024). 
 222 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 1400(c), 1463(a), 12 U.S.C. 
§ 2605(k)(1)(E) (Supp. V 2012). 
 223 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); see also id. § 551(a) (defining “agency” and bringing the Bureau under the 
APA); CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 20. 
 224 Cf. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 974 (2005). See 
generally CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2:30 (3d ed. 2013) (describing the 
relationship between the APA and specific enabling acts). 
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rules to be issued under notice and comment rulemaking and includes three 
additional requirements for new consumer protection rules: (1) considering the 
potential benefits and costs to consumers, (2) consulting with the appropriate 
agencies, and (3) responding to written objections from prudential regulators in 
the final rule.225 The Chevron doctrine must be applied to determine whether 
the Bureau properly interpreted these requirements when promulgating the 
amendments to ensure their procedural validity. The Bureau has satisfied the 
procedural requirements so long as its interpretation of the rulemaking 
requirements from the Dodd-Frank Act are “based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”226 
First, the Bureau must evaluate “the potential benefits and costs to 
consumers.”227 The Bureau asserts in the final rule that it considered potential 
benefits, costs, and impacts.228The Bureau evaluated the potential benefits and 
costs of the amendments to Regulation X to satisfy the first requirement by 
using market data, reports, figures, and other pieces of information to evaluate 
the costs and benefits and comparing the potential impact of the amendments 
against a “pre-statutory baseline.”229 
Information used in cost and benefit analysis is permitted so long as its use 
is not arbitrary and capricious.230 The information used is not arbitrary and 
capricious if the agency gives a logical explanation for the cost and benefit 
information it relies upon in promulgating a new rule.231 The Bureau offers an 
explanation for all of the data sources it used to analyze the costs and benefits 
for each of the broad rule amendments. For example, when writing the 
requirements for early contact with delinquent borrowers, the Bureau 
considered a Freddie Mac paper to understand how timing affects borrowers’ 
 
 225 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b) (outlining requirements beyond the APA that the Bureau must fulfill when 
promulgating new rules); CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 20. There are also specific requirements for the Bureau 
when the Bureau promulgates particular rules, such as declaring certain acts unfair and abusive. See 
CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 22–23. 
 226 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 227 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(A). 
 228 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,844 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024). 
 229 Id. at 10,845. Because the four amendments were not imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act, the pre-statute 
and post-statute baseline are the same. Id. 
 230 See Fla. Manufactured Hous. Ass’n, Inc. v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d 1565, 1579 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 231 See id. at 1580 (finding that HUD’s reliance on data created by its own engineers was not arbitrary and 
capricious). 
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responses to servicer outreach.232 The paper compares redefault rates for 
repayment plans established when borrowers were thirty days late on payments 
with borrowers who were sixty days late, and was used to determine the best 
time to contact delinquent borrowers.233 Additionally the Bureau examined a 
study of complaints to the HOPE Hotline when writing the continuity-of-
contact procedures.234 The study shows that over half of the complaints 
concerned lost documentation and an inability to reach servicers to obtain 
information about their Home Affordable Modification Program 
modifications.235 This study was used to show the benefits of assigning a point 
of contact within a servicer.236 The Bureau’s interpretation of the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s first rulemaking requirement is not arbitrary and capricious because the 
Bureau offers a logical explanation for using various data and reports to study 
the potential costs and benefits to consumers under each of the amendments.237 
Second, before proposing a rule and during the comment period, the 
Bureau must consult with the “appropriate” regulators and financial 
agencies.238 In promulgating these amendments, the Bureau has consulted, or 
offered to consult, with the prudential regulators,239 HUD, FHFA, the FTC, 
 
 232 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. at 10,856 (citing Amy Crews Cutts & William A. Merrill, Interventions in Mortgage Default: 
Policies and Practices to Prevent Home Loss and Lower Costs, at tbl.2 (Freddie Mac, Working Paper No. 08-
01, 2008)).  
 233 See id. at 10,856; see also id. at 10,855. 
 234 See id. at 10,857. 
 235 See id. The Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) was implemented in 2009 and offers 
subsidies to servicers to provide affordable loan modifications to eligible borrowers. See McCoy, supra note 6 
(manuscript at 19, 21). See generally About HMPadmin.com, HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM, 
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/resources/overview.jsp (last visited Aug. 16, 2013) (describing the 
assistance services offered by HAMP). 
 236 Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 10,856–57 (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: FURTHER 
ACTIONS NEEDED TO FULLY AND EQUITABLY IMPLEMENT FORECLOSURE MITIGATION PROGRAMS 15 (2010)). 
The HOPE Hotline is a twenty-four-hour telephone line that provides borrowers with free counseling and 
foreclosure information from HUD-certified housing counselors. See About the Homeowner’s HOPE Hotline, 
HOPE NOW, http://www.hopenow.com/hotline-aboutus.php (last visited Aug 16, 2013). The Hotline is run by 
the Homeownership Preservation Foundation, a nonprofit organization focused on helping homeowners avoid 
foreclosure. See id.  
 237 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Fla. 
Manufactured Hous. Ass’n, v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d 1565, 1580 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 238 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(B) 
(Supp. V 2012); CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 20. 
 239 The “prudential regulators” are collectively the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the National 
Credit Union Association. Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
and Prudential Regulators Issue Joint Guidance to Address Mortgage Servicer Practices that Impact 
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and FEMA.240 The Bureau also “held discussions with and solicited feedback” 
from the U.S. Department of Agriculture Rural Housing Service, the FHA, the 
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), and the 
Department of Veterans Affairs regarding the potential impacts of the final rule 
on mortgage loan insurance or securitization programs.241 
Each consulted agency has an integral role in federal consumer financial 
protection. Either it is or was formally responsible for one of three duties: 
(1) promulgating and enforcing consumer financial protection law,242 
(2) overseeing mortgage servicers and loan promulgation,243 or (3) regulating 
housing generally.244 Thus the Bureau did not act in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner when consulting with these agencies as the “appropriate” agencies.245 
Third, the Bureau must address any written objections brought up by 
prudential regulators when issuing the final regulation.246 The final rule, 
released on January 17, 2013, does not mention any written objections 
submitted by prudential regulators. The Bureau reported that it received 
approximately 300 comments on the Proposed Servicing Rules.247 The 
comments came from consumers, community banks, credit unions, federal and 
state regulators, community groups, and academics.248 The Bureau also 
received comments from the government-sponsored enterprises and the 
FHFA.249 There is no mention of any written comments or objections by 
 
Servicemembers (June 21, 2012), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-
financial-protection-bureau-and-prudential-regulators-issue-joint-guidance-to-address-mortgage-servicer-
practices-that-impact-servicemembers/. 
 240 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. at 10,842–43. 
 241 Id. 
 242 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617 (2006) (establishing and explaining HUD’s role under RESPA); 
About the Federal Trade Commission, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last 
visited Aug. 16, 2013).  
 243 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), supra note 24 (discussing Ginnie Mae’s oversight of 
mortgage servicers and loan promulgation); Home Loan Guaranty, U.S. DEPT. OF VETERAN AFF., http:// 
benefits.va.gov/HOMELOANS/index.asp?expandable=0 (last visited Aug. 16, 2013). 
 244 See, e.g., Housing Mission and Goals, FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, http://www.fhfa.gov/Default. 
aspx?Page=135 (last visited Aug. 16, 2013). 
 245 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(B) 
(Supp. V 2012). 
 246 See id. § 5512(b); CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 20.  
 247 Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. 
Reg. 10,696, 10,705 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024). 
 248 Id. at 10,705–06. 
 249 Id. at 10,706. 
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prudential regulators. In the absence of any such written objections, the third 
requirement is satisfied. 
The Bureau’s interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act’s rulemaking 
requirements is not arbitrary and capricious. Because the procedure used to 
promulgate the amendment and the amendment’s substance are valid, the 
amendments deserve deference as permissible interpretations of the Bureau’s 
rulemaking power under the second step of Chevron. 
IV.  EFFECTIVENESS OF AMENDMENTS 
The amendments to Regulation X show a significant departure from past 
government efforts to regulate mortgage servicers. As discussed in Parts I and 
II, regulation of mortgage servicing before the Dodd-Frank Act focused on 
disclosures.250 The enforcing agencies did not have the authority to implement 
recordkeeping requirements. The risks posed by poor servicer behavior were 
not understood because “the information was not out there.”251 Additionally, 
government programs since the financial crisis have focused on voluntary 
incentive programs rather than regulations that mandate specific procedures.252 
The amendments to Regulation X change regulatory gears because they 
implement the Bureau’s supervisory powers over all servicers. The 
amendments create uniformity of standards across the mortgage servicing 
industry. The amendments also create uniform servicer behavior through the 
collection of data. These data will allow the Bureau to monitor mortgage 
servicers and enforce consumer financial protection law more effectively than 
before the financial crisis. The data collection will also allow the Bureau to 
refine and write new regulations by identifying problematic areas. 
 
 250 See supra Parts I–II. 
 251 Yuki Noguchi, New Mortgage Rules Would Limit Risky Lending, NPR (Jan. 10, 2013, 3:24 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2013/01/10/168979256/new-mortgage-rules-would-limit-risky-lending (quoting Susan 
Wachter, a professor of real estate finance at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania). 
 252 See supra Part II.A.1.  
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A. Immediate Effects 
1. Industry Unity 
The amendments unify all mortgage servicers under a single set of 
regulations.253 This is a result of the Bureau’s authority over nondepository 
entities.254 Previously, servicers who were not banking institutions could slip 
under the regulatory radar.255 Now, however, the Bureau’s extended authority 
and the amendments’ clarification that the requirements apply to all servicers 
ensures compliance by all industry entities.256 The Bureau facilitates 
compliance with the amendments by incorporating requirements from other 
institutions, such as government-sponsored enterprises and the National 
Mortgage Settlement.257 Under the amendments, all servicers must implement 
and follow a standard set of procedures for communicating with delinquent 
borrowers and reviewing loss mitigation applications.258 
Industry experts believe that industry uniformity will create better 
outcomes for consumers.259 The uniformity among industry players creates 
fairness by providing industry-wide information about servicer activity and 
raising the bar for the standard of servicer procedures.260 Additionally, 
uniformity will provide borrowers with common expectations and outcomes 
regarding communication with servicers and applications for loss mitigation 
options.261 
 
 253 See Pete Mills, Senior Vice President, Residential Policy and Member Servs., Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 
Remarks at the CFPB Field Hearing on Mortgage Policy (Jan. 17, 2013), available at http://www. 
consumerfinance.gov/blog/live-from-atlanta-ga/. 
 254 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1024, 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1) (Supp. 
V 2012); CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 16. 
 255 See CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 3, 4; Gordon, supra note 49; supra Part II.A.  
 256 See CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 1, 9–11, 16. 
 257 See 2012 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) Mortgage Servicing Proposal, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 57,200, 57,205 (proposed Sept. 17, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024); supra Part II.B. 
 258 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,882–85 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.38–.41).  
 259 See, e.g., Mills, supra note 253. 
 260 See John Beggins, CEO, Specialized Loan Servicing, Remarks at the CFPB Field Hearing on 
Mortgage Policy (Jan. 17, 2013), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/live-from-atlanta-ga/. 
 261 See Mills, supra note 253. 
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2. Data Creation 
The Bureau’s supervisory function depends on the availability of data to 
analyze supervised entities.262 The Bureau is responsible for implementing and 
supervising compliance with federal consumer protection law.263 In order to 
support the rules that it promulgates, the Bureau must monitor relevant markets 
and consider such factors as the risks and costs associated with the purchase or 
use of regulated products and the understanding that consumers have of 
specific products and services.264 
Under the amendments, servicers must record their communication and loss 
mitigation efforts with borrowers by adhering to specific timelines, making 
specific personnel personally accountable, and keeping borrower documents.265 
The amendments have specific recordkeeping and filing requirements,266 
including the recording of oral and written outreach efforts to delinquent 
borrowers,267 the assignment of personnel to delinquent borrowers,268 and 
servicer’s actions in reviewing loss mitigation applications.269 
The amendments create an observable record of servicer behavior that is 
subject to Bureau supervision. The files and procedures required by the 
Regulation X amendments are subject to Bureau examination in accordance 
with procedures in the Bureau’s Supervision and Examination Manual.270 
Significant findings from Bureau examinations must be published in at least 
one report each year.271 Prudential regulators and federal agencies that have 
jurisdiction over the entity can access these reports.272 
 
 262 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL, at Overview 3–
4, Examinations 3 (version 2, 2011) [hereinafter CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL]. 
 263 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(1) 
(Supp. V 2012). 
 264 See id. § 5512(c)(2). 
 265 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,882–85 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38–.41). 
 266 See id. at 10,883 (to be codified at § 1024.38(c)). 
 267 See id. (to be codified at § 1024.39). 
 268 See id. at 10,883–84 (to be codified at § 1024.40(a)). 
 269 See id. at 10,884–85 (to be codified at § 1024.41). 
 270 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(4)(A) 
(Supp. V 2012); CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 262; see also Mortgage 
Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. at 10,697–98. 
 271 See 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(3)(A). 
 272 See id. § 5512(c)(6)(C)(i). 
DEWAR GALLEYSPROOFS2 9/24/2013  12:11 PM 
2013] REGULATION X 213 
Requiring servicers to record their interactions with delinquent borrowers 
creates accountability by allowing the Bureau to identify violations of federal 
consumer protection laws. The Bureau is authorized to conduct investigations 
to determine whether any entity has violated consumer protection laws.273 The 
Bureau’s review of servicer action includes reviewing consumer complaints 
and consumer surveys.274 The data from the amendments can be used to 
corroborate consumer complaints and can be reinforced through the Bureau’s 
powers to issue subpoenas, conduct hearings, and engage in joint 
investigations with other federal agencies.275 
The vesting of accountability in mortgage servicers and the Bureau’s 
monitoring authority should lead to the efficient enforcement of federal 
consumer protection laws. The Bureau intends to back the new rule with its 
full enforcement and supervisory authority.276 The Bureau’s enforcement 
powers over mortgage servicers range from limiting the activities a servicer 
can participate in to notifying the public of violations and implementing hefty 
consumer relief measures.277 Having data recording a servicer’s 
communication with borrowers and compliance with consumer protection law 
allows the Bureau to implement the most effective enforcement options when 
it discovers instances of noncompliance.278 
The data on servicer behavior will also allow the Bureau to identify gaps in 
the amendment and promulgate new regulations in the future to 
comprehensively regulate the mortgage servicing industry. The Bureau’s 
Supervision and Examination Manual demonstrates a shift in regulatory focus 
 
 273 See id. §§ 5561(1), 5562(a); CFPB SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 262, at 
Overview 1, 4. 
 274 See 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(4)(B)(i). 
 275 See id. §§ 5562–5564, 5566. The Bureau has set up a formal system to receive, review, track, and 
follow up on consumer complaints. See generally Submit a Complaint, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http:// 
www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2013). 
 276 See Cordray, supra note 9 (“We will be vigilant about enforcing these rules.”). 
 277 See 12 U.S.C. § 5565. The Bureau can charge penalties for violations of federal consumer protection 
law up to $1 million. See id. § 5565(c). The Bureau’s first three enforcement actions against credit card 
companies (Capital One Bank, Discover Bank, and American Express) for illegal practices, including 
misleading consumers about fees and deceptive marketing, recovered $435 million in relief for 5.75 million 
customers plus civil penalties of $101.5 million. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISORY 
HIGHLIGHTS: FALL 2012, at 7 (2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_ 
supervisory-highlights-fall-2012.pdf. 
 278 Corrective action may be taken in conjunction with other federal agencies See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU, supra note 277, at 8 (describing a joint enforcement action against Capital One Bank with the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency after discovering noncompliance with federal consumer protection laws). 
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from ensuring compliance with a law to identifying consumer risk.279 For 
example, if the Bureau observes the data for servicers regarding the loss 
mitigation application review procedures and finds that borrowers are being 
denied loss mitigation options in specific patterns, the Bureau may promulgate 
new regulations to address these patterns. The Bureau’s ability to create new 
regulation for servicers in response to emerging patterns of behavior is 
especially important because conventional market forces do not incentivize the 
mortgage servicing industry.280 The data accumulated by the amendments will 
allow the Bureau to identify consumer risk and promulgate laws to mitigate 
that risk. 
B. Potential Gaps for Further Regulation 
Despite the strong impact of the amendments on the mortgage servicing 
industry, Regulation X still has several gaps that the Bureau should fill with 
further regulation. First, the amendments do not provide borrowers with a 
guaranteed loss mitigation option, which may give servicers the opportunity to 
avoid providing borrowers affordable loan modifications. Second, the 
amendments do not give servicers a legal safe haven that would avoid violating 
provisions of the servicers’ PSAs when opting to implement loss mitigation 
efforts. Third, the amendments explicitly preempt areas of state foreclosure 
law and although the amendments may lead to a decrease in the number of 
foreclosures resulting from the dual-track system, preemption issues may 
hinder this progress. 
1. No Requirements for Choosing and Evaluating Loss Mitigation Options 
Regulation X explicitly disclaims a requirement to provide borrowers with 
loss mitigation options, stating that “[n]othing in § 1024.41 imposes a duty on 
a servicer to provide any borrower with any specific loss mitigation option.”281 
The Regulation X amendments do not require servicers to provide delinquent 
borrowers with affordable loan modifications.282 Although borrowers have the 
right to enforce the amendments’ loss mitigation application review provisions, 
 
 279 LINDA GALLAGHER & AMY MATSUO, KPMG, CFPB ISSUES FIRST SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION 
MANUAL—MORTGAGE SERVICING GUIDELINES INCLUDED (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.kpmg.com/ 
US/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/regulatory-practice-letters/Documents/rpl-11-25.pdf. 
 280 See supra Part I.A. 
 281 Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. 
Reg. 10,696, 10,884 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(a)). 
 282 See Gordon, supra note 49. 
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to receive notice of a servicer’s decision, and to appeal the denial of a loan 
modification, servicers are not required to provide borrowers with any loss 
mitigation option, far less an affordable loan modification.283 Without proper 
restrictions, servicers are able to push through harmful, rather than sustainable, 
loss mitigation options.284 
Servicers are able to limit what loss mitigation options are available to 
borrowers because servicers control the eligibility criteria for each option.285 
As discussed in Part I, servicers compare the prospective outcomes of 
foreclosure and various loss mitigation options through NPV calculations.286 
Section C of Part I noted that there is no standard for what should be included 
in an NPV calculation other than four vague factors, with no guidance as to 
how those factors should be weighed.287 Under the amendments, servicers are 
only required to reveal the inputs for NPV calculations when a borrower has 
been denied a trial or permanent loan modification on the basis of the NPV 
calculation.288 The Bureau has no basis to find fault with a servicer’s decision 
to deny a borrower an affordable loan modification option if the servicer has 
followed all of the required procedures. 
Without strong restrictions on NPV calculations and a standard 
methodology for loss mitigation decisions, mortgage servicers will continue to 
have considerable discretion to implement unsustainable loss mitigation 
options that are harmful to borrowers.289 Servicers have almost exclusive 
discretion as to what values are entered into the NPV factors and have the 
flexibility to consider additional factors including recouping costs, servicer 
compensation, and the existence of junior liens on the property.290 These 
additional factors incentivize servicers to pursue loss mitigation options that 
 
 283 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. at 10,884–85 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(a), (d), (h)). 
 284 See Thompson, supra note 22, at 829 (“As long as servicers can choose not to perform modification, 
they will, by and large, choose the path of least resistance—foreclosures and temporary modifications that strip 
wealth from both investors and homeowners.”); supra Part I.C. 
 285 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. at 10,827. 
 286 See supra Part I.C. 
 287 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 37–40); supra Part I.C. 
 288 Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 10,897 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(d)(1) cmt. 2). 
 289 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 37–40); Press Release, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 
20. 
 290 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 41). For further reading on the incentives of mortgage 
servicers, see id. (manuscript passim), Thompson, supra note 22, and Cordell et al., supra note 37. 
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are harmful to borrowers, such as forbearing principal payments and 
capitalizing arrears.291 Under the amendments, servicers are still able to 
manipulate NPV formulas to justify their loss mitigation option decisions. 
Although the amendments allow borrowers to enforce the review 
requirements for loss mitigation applications through private action,292 the 
amendments to Regulation X do not go far enough to provide borrowers with 
access to affordable loan modifications as a form of loss mitigation. The 
Bureau should use its rulemaking authority to issue additional regulations to 
increase the certainty for borrowers to obtain affordable loan modifications. 
First, the new regulations should require servicers to implement affordable 
loan modifications for categories of homeowners for whom the foreclosure 
process would be most detrimental, such as the elderly, low-income families, 
or families suffering from an unexpected loss such as unemployment.293 
Second, new regulations should be issued that grant the Bureau the right to 
review and approve servicer NPV formulae and “waterfalls.” Review 
procedures are in place for servicers subject to The National Mortgage 
Settlement. Under the National Mortgage Settlement, the Bureau has the right 
to obtain the servicer’s NPV formula.294 However, the factor-based nature of 
NPV calculations means that the right to obtain the formula does little to 
control servicer decisions. The Bureau should have the right to prohibit the use 
of an NPV formula that leads to patterns of unsustainable loan modifications. 
Similarly, the Bureau should be able to review servicer waterfalls to emphasize 
principal and interest reduction efforts over detrimental modifications such as 
the capitalization of arrears or the extension of a loan’s term.295 Although these 
restrictions would conflict with PSA provisions, they would assure borrowers 
of the possibility to stay in their homes and become current on their mortgages. 
 
 291 See McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 41); Thompson, supra note 22, at 772 (“Servicers can . . . 
make more money by making short-term unsustainable payment agreements than they can by making long-
term, sustainable modifications.”). 
 292 Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 10,884 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(a)); see Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 
U.S.C. § 2605(f) (2006). 
 293 See Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. & Nat’l Ass’n of Consumer Advocates, Comments to the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, NCLC.ORG 2 (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_ 
mortgage/mortgage_servicing/comments-cfpb-servicing-respa.pdf. 
 294 Antonio F. Dias, Lee Ann Russo & Albert J. Rota, CFPB to Play Significant Role Under Foreclosure 
Settlement Proposal, JONES DAY (March 2011), http://www.jonesday.com/cfpb_to_play/. 
 295 See Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. & Nat’l Ass’n of Consumer Advocates, supra note 293, at 42–43. 
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2. No Legal Safe Haven for Servicer Decisions 
The amendments do not provide servicers with a legal shield for pursuing 
loss mitigation options. Servicers have cited concerns with potential violations 
of PSA provisions for modifying too many loans in a securitized pool as one 
deterrent for implementing loan modifications.296 Many scholars claim that the 
fear of investor lawsuits is “overblown” and there have been no suits by 
investors against servicers that question a servicer’s decision to modify a 
defaultant loan.297 Nevertheless, the lack of a legal shield from liability from 
investors and trustees may mean that legal advisors for mortgage servicers 
would suggest that servicers err on the side of caution and make loss mitigation 
and foreclosure decisions that align with the language in the PSAs rather than 
in the best interest of borrowers. 
3. Dual-Track and Preemption Concerns 
The amendments explicitly aim to restrict the dual-track system.298 The 
dual-track system—which requires a servicer to proceed with the foreclosure 
process while considering loss mitigation options—has led to foreclosures 
even when borrowers thought they had successfully completed loss mitigation 
discussions with servicers.299 The fourth amendment restricts unnecessary 
foreclosures from the dual-track system in two ways. First, it creates a 120-day 
buffer from taking any foreclosure action after a borrower’s delinquency.300 
Second, once a borrower has submitted a loss mitigation application, even if 
the account is more than 120 days delinquent, a servicer cannot initiate or 
finalize the foreclosure process until loss mitigation options have been denied 
or rejected, the appeals process is exhausted, or the borrower fails to comply 
with the terms of the loss mitigation option.301 
 
 296 Some PSAs contain provisions that restrict the circumstances under which loans within a securitized 
pool can be modified. See THOMPSON, supra note 25, at 5, 6, 8 (“Servicers have claimed to fear investor 
lawsuits.”); McCoy, supra note 6 (manuscript at 35–36). 
 297 THOMPSON, supra note 25, at 8. 
 298 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,698 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024); supra Part I.B (describing the 
dual-track system).  
 299 See The Need for National Mortgage Servicing Standards: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous., 
Transp., & Cmty. Dev. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 6, 7 (2011) 
[hereinafter Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous., Transp., and Cmty. Dev.] (statement of Diane E. 
Thompson, Of Counsel, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr.). 
 300 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. at 10,885 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f)(1)). 
 301 See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f)–(g)). 
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It is interesting that the Bureau did not eliminate the dual-track system, 
despite professional recommendation to do so.302 Eliminating the dual-track 
system would have been complicated since credit rating agencies and PSAs 
generally require servicers to implement a dual-track system to maximize 
efficiency.303 The Bureau could accomplish elimination of the dual-track 
system prospectively by mandating a change in the standard PSA language. 
Although the foreclosure buffers may stop servicers from pushing through 
foreclosures hastily, the amendments do not guarantee that the problems and 
foreclosures stemming from the dual-track system will go away. During the 
120-day buffer, borrowers are not required to submit loss mitigation 
applications, but merely told that the option is available.304 Borrowers might 
not take advantage of the buffer time to pursue loss mitigation options.305 Once 
the buffer has passed and none of the loss mitigation processing conditions 
apply, servicers are unrestricted to implement the foreclosure process.306 At 
this point, a borrower’s credit score takes a strong hit and administrative fees 
begin to accumulate, regardless of whether the process actually ends with a 
foreclosure.307 
Beyond remaining complications for borrowers, the amendments 
complicate state law. The amendments expressly preempt portions of state real 
estate law.308 States may adopt broader consumer protection regulations, but 
servicers must respect certain Bureau instructions, such as foreclosure 
timelines, regardless of applicable state law.309 Preemption complicates 
 
 302 See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous., Transp., and Cmty. Dev., supra note 299, at 7 (“The dual-
track system must be ended.”) (statement of Diane E. Thompson, Of Counsel, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr.); 
Press Release, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., supra note 20. 
 303 Thompson, supra note 22, at 795, 799. 
 304 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. at 10,884–85 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41). 
 305 Servicers have reported difficulties in making contact with delinquent borrowers and have suggested 
that distressed borrowers may not respond to servicer outreach because the borrowers feel nothing can help 
them or servicer contact may accelerate losing their home. See Cordell et al., supra note 37, at 10. 
 306 See Gordon, supra note 49. 
 307 See id. 
 308 See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 
Fed. Reg. at 10,877 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1024.33(d)). 
 309 See id. at 10,706 (“Specifically . . . § 1024.41(f) bars a servicer from making the first notice or filing 
required for a foreclosure process unless a borrower is more than 120 days delinquent, notwithstanding that 
state law may permit any such filing.”). 
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foreclosure law where the 120-day buffer directly conflicts with state 
foreclosure statutes.310 
It would be beneficial to have an explanation and demonstration of 
conformity between the Bureau’s regulations and state law. The Bureau 
regulations render state foreclosure laws worthless for 120 days. It is unclear, 
and arguably unlikely, that state legislatures will react to the Regulation X 
amendments with changes to state foreclosure laws. Although the Bureau 
makes clear in the amendments that servicers must follow the foreclosure 
timelines in the amendments, the Bureau should issue an advisory opinion on 
how servicers should consider the amendments’ restrictions alongside state 
foreclosure procedures. 
Overall, the immediate effects of the amendments outweigh the potential 
gaps. The amendments to Regulation X represent a strong step by the Bureau 
in the direction of regulating mortgage servicers and protecting borrowers from 
unnecessary foreclosures. The amendments place the Bureau in a powerful 
position to track servicer behavior and the Bureau is able to use its arsenal of 
enforcement tools to efficiently enforce federal consumer protection law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Regulation X Amendments, requiring standard recordkeeping 
procedures, early delinquent-borrower contact, continuity of contact, and loss 
mitigation procedures by all servicers, demonstrate a new method of regulating 
mortgage servicing. The amendments create a data record of servicer behavior 
that allows the Bureau to efficiently enforce and, if necessary, rewrite federal 
consumer protection law. Although there are gaps in the uniformly applied 
requirements, the amendments pursue the Bureau’s goals of transparency and 
accountability in mortgage servicing. 
Importantly, the amendments to Regulation X are a legally permissible way 
to control mortgage servicers under the second step of the Chevron doctrine. 
Because the amendments are not contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, 
an assumption of deference is appropriate. A reviewing court would be 
required to defer to the Bureau’s regulations because the servicing 
requirements, early contact requirements, continuity-of-contact procedures, 
 
 310 In some states, a nonjudicial foreclosure can be completed in as little as six weeks. The states with the 
shortest foreclosure times are Georgia (thirty-seven days), Tennessee (forty to forty-five days) and Texas 
(twenty-seven days). See Foreclosure Laws and Procedures by State, supra note 72. 
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and loss mitigation procedures are reasonable interpretations, fulfilling 
RESPA’s purpose to do what is necessary to protect consumers. 
The amendments demonstrate a change in the government’s attitude toward 
mortgage servicers. The amendments show that servicers are no longer seen as 
passive entities, but as players in the financial marketplace whose actions have 
distinct consequences. The amendments to Regulation X are a strong first step 
in controlling servicer behavior but demonstrate that the Bureau still has much 
to learn about the mortgage servicing industry. 
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